Concerns have emerged regarding the vulnerability of the U.S. defense industrial base due to its reliance on materials sourced from China. A report released by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) on July 24, 2024, outlines significant national security risks tied to the U.S. military’s dependence on foreign suppliers for critical weapon systems.
The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) relies on a complex network of over 200,000 suppliers to procure materials essential for military equipment. Despite this extensive supply chain, the GAO report highlights a troubling shortfall: of more than 99 critical materials identified by the DOD for fiscal year 2023, none were sourced from the United States. This situation raises alarms about the potential for adversarial nations, notably China, to disrupt access to vital components.
The GAO stresses that the existing Federal Procurement Data System provides limited data regarding the origins of materials. Currently, federal contractors are not required to disclose the full range of manufacturing locations for their components. This lack of transparency creates a pathway for foreign suppliers to potentially introduce vulnerabilities into U.S. military technology.
In the report, the GAO warns, “These suppliers may cut off U.S. access to critical materials or provide ‘back doors’ in their technology that serve as intelligence pathways.” Notably, China has already demonstrated this risk in 2024 by imposing export restrictions on gallium and germanium, minerals deemed critical for military-grade electronics.
The issue was underscored during the production of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, where manufacturing was halted after the discovery of Chinese components. Although the fighter jet is assembled with assistance from allied nations such as the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, the presence of Chinese magnets in the supply chain led to a pause in production while alternatives were sought. Lockheed Martin, the prime contractor for the F-35, notified the DOD in 2023 and 2024 about these prohibited components.
The reliance on foreign materials extends beyond aircraft to the naval shipbuilding sector. The GAO indicates that the U.S. submarine production is facing challenges due to dependence on foreign titanium supplies. Submarines require titanium casting for critical components, yet the U.S. lacks the capacity to produce this material domestically. Currently, only one foundry in the U.S. is capable of producing the large titanium castings necessary for key weapons systems.
Despite recognizing the risks associated with foreign dependency, the DOD has not undertaken significant measures to improve its oversight of material origins. The GAO suggests that one potential solution could involve requiring suppliers to disclose more detailed information about the sources of their materials. Some DOD officials assert that such information is accessible, while others caution that this requirement may be prohibitively expensive or that suppliers might resist sharing it.
The findings of this report serve as a critical reminder of the national security implications tied to the supply chains that support U.S. military readiness. As the landscape of global supply chains continues to evolve, the DOD faces pressing challenges in ensuring the integrity and security of its essential materials.